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I. INTRODUCTION
At 9:02 a.m. on September 11, 2001, the world watched in horror
as American Airlines Flight 175 slammed into the South Tower of the
World Trade Center on live television,' ending all consideration that the
first collision might have been an accident.2 Halfway around the world,
Ali al Bahlul sat in a remote part of Afghanistan operating a radio so
that Usama Bin Laden could monitor reports of the attacks.3 That day,
Al Qaeda terrorists killed 2,977 people,4 caused billions of dollars of
economic damage,5 and initiated the defining sociopolitical issue of the
early 21st century.
Legal practitioners have faced the difficult question of how best
to hold terrorists such as Bahlul accountable while remaining true to
fundamental constitutional principles and established law. After
September 11, the United States quickly established military
commissions to prosecute captured terrorists for violations of the law of
war, but it did so in an ad hoc manner with little statutory
authorization.6 The need for a more robust body of law to ensure
1. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND ENG'G, NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., FLIGHT PATH STUDY -
UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175 2 (2002), http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBBl96/
doc03.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z7WK-6UD6].
2. See Introduction to the Encyclopedia of 9/11, NEW YORK, Sept. 5, 2011, at 34,
http://nymag.com/news/9-11/10th-anniversary/intro/ [http://perma.cc/GKU3-SBAF] ("Just as we'd
begun to absorb this strange sight, wondering what pilot could have been so dim as to steer his
plane into one of those towers . . . , came a second plane, then a terrible blossom of flame, then the
billowing smoke enshrouding downtown.").
3. Al Bahlul v. United States (Bahlul 1), 767 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
4. Accounting of the Dead, NEW YORK, Sept. 5, 2011, at 54-55, http://nymag.comlnews/9-
11/10th-anniversary/number-of-deaths/ [http://perma.ccl3LBV-WZZM] (reporting 224 killed at the
Pentagon and on UA Flight 93 and 2753 in New York).
5. 9/11 by the Numbers, NEW YORK, http://nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/
numbers.htm [http://perma.ccN7MF-DWLW] (last updated Sept. 2014).
6. Steven I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4
J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 295, 295 (2010). See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 1), 548 U.S. 557,
559-60 (2006) (holding that there was no explicit statutory authorization for the Guantanamo
military commissions and that as constituted, they violated Geneva Conventions requirements for
treatment of detainees); Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001)
(establishing military commissions under authority of the Authorization for Use of Military Force);
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002),
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/milcomord1.pdf [http://perma.cc/TLM4-W4DP] (establishing basic
framework of procedure for military commissions).
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consistency and fairness soon became apparent. Thus, Congress passed
the Military Commissions Act ("MCA") in 2006 to define charges and
establish a comprehensive framework for the prosecution of alleged
terrorists and others accused of committing war crimes in the course of
hostilities against the United States.7 Among the crimes the MCA
defined were terrorism, hijacking an aircraft, destruction of property in
violation of the law of war, attacking civilians, attacking civilian
property, and conspiracy to commit those offenses.8
Those charged under the MCA soon challenged its
constitutionality, as well as the constitutionality of the commissions
system more generally.9 A prominent contention was that the MCA
retroactively permitted prosecution for some crimes in violation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution,10 which prohibits retroactive
criminalization of previously innocent acts. Most of those charged in
commissions faced trial for acts they had allegedly committed before the
MCA was written. They claimed that their actions were not
criminalized under domestic or international law at the time they
allegedly undertook them. By retroactively applying the MCA, they
contended, Congress had created a paradigmatic example of the type of
ex post facto law prohibited by Article I of the Constitution.
Prior to the MCA, the only statutory mention of military
commissions was in Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
("UCMJ"), which granted commissions jurisdiction over violations of
the "law of war."" Accordingly, the question of whether the MCA
creates an ex post facto violation turns on what body or bodies of law
the 'law of war" includes and whether a given charge was criminalized
under that law at the time of the accused's alleged actions. While the
courts have individually analyzed and resolved the ex post facto issue
with respect to most charges available under the MCA, the question of
whether the MCA's criminalization of conspiracy violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause remains unresolved.12
7. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w (2006).
8. 10 U.S.C. § 950t (2006).
9. E.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir 2014);
Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan II), 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604
F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009).
10. Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d at 8.
11. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). Section 821 was amended in 2006 to explicitly exclude military
commissions under Chapter 47A-under which Bahlul was convicted-but at the time of his
actions § 821 applied to all military commissions, as it had since 1956. Law of Aug. 10, 1956, ch.
1041, 70A Stat. 44 (1956) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2012)).
12. Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d at 62 (Brown, J., dissenting):
[B]y reviewing Bahlul's retroactivity arguments under the plain error standard, the
court disposes of this case without providing the government clear guidance for
1369
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The predominant understanding is that conspiracy is not a crime
under international law.13 Accordingly, defendants and some scholars
argue that if Article 21 refers to the international law of war, retroactive
application of the MCA's conspiracy provision violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause. In response, the government has argued that the law of war
referenced in Article 21 includes not only international law but also
domestic precedent arising out of commissions during the 19th century
and World War II. Those commissions prosecuted conspiracy, at least
sporadically, providing a basis to argue that the MCA's conspiracy
provision merely codified a preexisting crime.
When presented with the opportunity to resolve this issue in Al
Bahlul v. United States (Bahlul 1), the D.C. Circuit declined to do so.14
In light of apparent Supreme Court disagreement regarding the
foregoing arguments,15 the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc held only that
the lower court did not commit "plain error" in finding the charge of
conspiracy to be constitutional.1 6 However, on remand to the panel to
address other challenges to the conviction, the D.C. Circuit overcame
its uncertainty about the content of the "law of war."17 Revitalizing the
Circuit's earlier holding that the "law of war" is limited to international
law,18 the panel vacated Bahlul's conspiracy conviction on the ground
that it violated the separation of powers guaranteed in Article III of the
Constitution.19 If conspiracy is only a domestic offense, the panel held,
it does not fall within the exception for law-of-war military commissions
prosecuting the remaining detainees at Guantanamo. Thus, it may be many years
before the government receives a definitive answer on whether it can charge the
September 11 perpetrators with conspiracy, or whether Congress has the power to make
such an offense triable by military commission even prospectively.
13. E.g., id. at 30 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Brian C. Baldrate, The Supreme Court's Role in
Defining the Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals: A Study, Critique, & Proposal for Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 186 MIL. L. REV. 1, 111 (2005); David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen
Years of Turmoil over the Guantanamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131,
154-55 (2008).
14. 767 F.3d at 31.
15. In Hamdan I, a 4-3 plurality stated, while addressing a different issue, that Article 21
simply incorporated international law. 548 U.S. 557, 641 (2006). The dissent, on the other hand,
maintained that it also included a U.S. "common law of war." Id. at 689-90 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
16. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 26-27.
17. See Al Bahlul v. United States (Bahlul II), 792 F.3d 1, 8-10 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating that
domestic law can restrict, but not expand, the "law of war" as defined in international law).
18. Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Steve Vladek, What's Left of
Hamdan II? Quite a Lot, Actually..., JUST SECURITY (July 17, 2014, 9:50 AM),
http://justsecurity.org/12989/left-hamdan-ii-lot-actually/ [http://perma.cc/22RT-HZJX] (arguing
that the en banc ruling in Bahlul left undisturbed the panel's Hamdan II holding on the meaning
of "law of war").
19. Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 22.
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to the Constitution's requirement that the judicial power be vested in
Article III courts.20
Although the legal basis differs for the Article III and Ex Post
Facto arguments, they were treated similarly in Bahlul because both
parties and the court uncritically adopted the predominant
understanding that the international law of war does not criminalize
conspiracy.21 This Note challenges that understanding, arguing that the
MCA's conspiracy charge does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause,
even if the D.C. Circuit correctly held that the "law of war" is limited to
international law.
First, although it has sometimes gone by other names,
conspiracy has long existed as a mode of liability under international
law.2 2 The conduct underlying this international mode of liability is the
same as that underlying a completed, standalone conspiracy chargeable
under the MCA-that is, one in which the underlying offense was
carried out. A nuanced interpretation of the MCA's text reveals that it
only criminalizes completed conspiracies and, accordingly, only conduct
that was already criminal under international law. Consequently, the
MCA merely codifies the international law mode of liability as a
substantive offense. Furthermore, while the government's burden of
proof for conspiracy under the MCA initially appears lower than that
under international law, the jurisdictional restrictions on military
commissions render these burdens of proof identical.
This Note's approach to the Article III and Ex Post Facto issues
bears a critical advantage arising from a subtle difference in the nature
of these questions. While both turn on what the "law of war" means, the
Ex Post Facto question only requires a statutory interpretation of that
phrase,23 whereas the Article III question requires a constitutional
interpretation, thereby permanently defining Congress's latitude in
matters of foreign policy and national security.24 Thus, the soundest
route for defending the constitutionality of the MCA's conspiracy
charge, as this Note does, is through the Ex Post Facto analysis.
Part II discusses the relevant law: UCMJ Article 21 prior to the
MCA's enactment and the MCA's relevant substantive and
jurisdictional provisions. It then describes the D.C. Circuit's en banc
holding in Bahlul I and the court's failure to resolve the conspiracy
20. Id.
21. See generally Bahlul I, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir 2014); Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1.
22. "Mode of liability" is an international-law term of art equivalent to the domestic-law
notion of a theory of liability-a form of participation in an offense that gives rise to criminal
liability for that offense. For a more in-depth discussion, see infra Section III.B. 1.
23. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 22.
24. Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 28 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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issue. Finally, it details the panel's invalidation of the conspiracy
charge on separation-of-powers grounds in Bahlul II and explains why
the Ex Post Facto analysis is still the most appropriate approach to the
solution-because it allows the Supreme Court to resolve both the
Article III and Ex Post Facto issues in a single stroke without making
a binding constitutional pronouncement.
Part III assumes that the "law of war" in UCMJ Article 21 is
limited to international law. It begins with a discussion of the purpose
behind ex post facto protection and delineates the two-pronged
approach by which it achieves that purpose: (1) protection of
substantive conduct, and (2) protection against retroactively lowering
the burden of proof. It then analyzes many courts' conclusions that the
MCA's conspiracy provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, arguing
that such conclusions are misguided because they overemphasize the
MCA's use of the word "conspiracy." Part III then differentiates
between conspiracy as a standalone crime for a completed offense and
the crime of an inchoate conspiracy-that is, a conspiracy that is never
actually attempted. Finally, Part III asserts that charging standalone
conspiracy for a completed offense is equivalent to the established
practice in international law of charging conspiracy as a mode of
liability. Therefore, the MCA only violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if
it is interpreted to criminalize inchoate conspiracies.
Part IV offers a solution to the Ex Post Facto question: the
MCA's conspiracy statute uniquely assumes in all cases that there will
be victims of the conspiracy. The language of this statute provides a
textual basis for interpreting the MCA as criminalizing only completed
conspiracies. Interpreting the MCA in this way satisfies the conduct
prong of ex post facto protection, as the conduct comprising a completed
conspiracy has long been criminalized under international law. Under
this interpretation of the conspiracy statute, the government must
additionally prove at the jurisdictional stage an element not expressly
found in the MCA: completion of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the
government must prove all the same elements under the MCA as under
international law, thereby satisfying the legal prong of ex post facto
protection. Thus, this Note's interpretation of the MCA is
constitutionally sound because it satisfies both prongs of ex post facto
protection.
II. How DIFFICULT IS IT TO CONVICT AN ADMITTED TERRORIST?
The lack of detail in the law governing military commissions
prior to the MCA has made it difficult to determine a clear answer to
Bahlul's constitutional challenges. However, a brief history of the law
1372 [Vol. 68:5:1367
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provides insight into these questions. This Part examines the legal
background of military commissions, beginning with the original grant
of authority to military commissions in place prior to the MCA. Because
this Note focuses on the Ex Post Facto question, this Part begins by
providing the basis for that challenge. It then recounts the D.C.
Circuit's en banc and panel decisions and explains why an Ex Post Facto
analysis is preferable to an Article III analysis-it minimizes the extent
to which the Court must engage in constitutional interpretation with
binding effects on the other branches of government.
A. The Law Governing Military Commissions
The law governing military commissions can be neatly divided
into two categories:25 (1) the law prior to the MCA, which primarily
consists of case law, and (2) the MCA itself, which radically changed the
nature of military-commissions law by providing the first robust
statutory scheme governing commissions. Because the central question
of this Note is whether the MCA's conspiracy charge retroactively
criminalizes conduct that was previously legal, the status of conspiracy
under each category is determinative. This Section discusses each
category in turn.
1. UCMJ Article 21: The Law Prior to the MCA
Prior to the MCA's enactment, there was but one scant mention
of military commissions in federal statute. UCMJ Article 21 stated:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive
military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may
be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.2 6
Article 21's preservation of jurisdiction effectively served as a
congressional grant of authority to military commissions to try
offenders for violations of the "law of war." Unfortunately, Congress did
not define what those offenses were, nor did it clearly indicate what it
meant by the "law of war."
25. A military commission is a criminal tribunal established under the President's authority
as Commander in Chief to try persons for crimes committed in the context of armed conflict when
other courts lack jurisdiction. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1942) (describing the history
and purpose of military commissions and the source of the President's authority to establish them).
There are three sets of circumstances in which they may be employed. The first is as a stand-in for
civilian courts in places where martial law has been declared. The second is to try civilians for
crimes in occupied territory. The third, which is at issue in the controversy addressed by this Note,
is to try enemy forces for violations of the law of war. Hamdan 1, 548 U.S. 557, 595-97 (2006).
26. See supra note 11.
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Given the phrase's usual usage both in case law and legal
vernacular, "law of war" may be naturally understood to refer to the
body of international law governing conduct in warfare.27 Indeed, the
D.C. Circuit in Bahlul II reached this decision with little more than one
paragraph of reasoning.28 According to the panel's understanding,
Article 21 merely incorporates the international law of war into
domestic law. For reasons explained below, however, whether Article
21 stops at incorporating the international law of war or also includes
independent domestic precedent has become the central issue regarding
the constitutionality of the MCA's conspiracy charge.29 The D.C.
Circuit's reasoning in Bahlul I indicates that Supreme Court precedent
on the matter is not as clear as the panel made it seem in Bahlul II.30
Even if it were clear to what body of law Article 21 refers, the
Supreme Court would still face the potentially difficult task of
determining the content of that body of law. It is at least clear that since
1956, Article 21 has explicitly authorized military commissions to try
violations of the law of war.31 Accordingly, any crime defined in the
MCA that was already a violation of the law of war under Article 21
would not retroactively create a new offense and thus would not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause.
2. The Military Commissions Act of 2006
In 2006 Congress passed the MCA and significantly expanded
the statutory basis for military commissions. It did so in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the commissions
then underway did not comply with certain requirements of the Geneva
Conventions.32 The substantive offenses in the MCA include terrorism,
27. See Hamdan 1, 548 U.S. at 641 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he law of war ... is the
body of international law governing armed conflict."); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 354 (1952)
("The 'law of war'. .. includes at least that part of the law of nations which defines the powers and
duties of belligerent powers."); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29 (describing the law of war as a
"branch of international law"); Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 37 (Rogers, J., dissenting) ("For more than
seventy years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 'law of war' to mean the international law
of war."); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520-21 (2004) (citing the Geneva and Hague
Conventions to determine the content of the "law of war").
28. Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 8-9.
29. Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d. at 22 ("We must therefore ascertain whether conspiracy to commit
war crimes was a 'law of war' offense triable by military commission under section 821 when
Bahlul's conduct occurred because, if so, Bahlul's ex post facto argument fails.").
30. Id. at 22-24.
31. Law of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 44 (1956) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 821).
32. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 6 ("In response to the Hamdan decision, the Congress enacted the
Military Commissions Act of 2006."); Hamdan I, 548 U.S. at 559-60; David Glazier, The Misuse of
History: Conspiracy and the Guantanamo Military Commissions, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 295, 304
(2014).
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hijacking an aircraft, destruction of property in violation of the law of
war, attacking civilians, and attacking civilian property, among
others.33 The MCA also criminalizes conspiracy to commit any of these
crimes:
Any person subject o this chapter who conspires to commit one or more substantive
offenses triable by military commission under this chapter, and who knowingly does any
overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall be punished, if death results to one or
more of the victims, by death or such other punishment as a military commission under
this chapter may direct, and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such
punishment, other than death, as a military commission under this chapter may direct. 3
The MCA grants jurisdiction "to try any offense made
punishable by this chapter or the law of war when committed by an
alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September 11,
2001."35 Its retroactivity immediately raises an Ex Post Facto concern.36
The Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws-those that retroactively
criminalize a previously innocent act.3 7 This includes removing an
element from the definition of a crime, as well as increasing the
punishment for a crime.38 Accordingly, if any of the crimes the MCA
defines were not already criminalized, their retroactive application
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.39 The testing ground for the
constitutionality of the MCA's alleged retroactive application has been
the case of Al Bahlul v. United States.40
B. Bahlul and the D.C. Circuit's Non-resolution of the
Ex Post Facto Question
By his own admission, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul was
Usama Bin Laden's personal assistant and public relations secretary.41
Bahlul grew up in Yemen.42 He first associated with Al Qaeda in the
1990s when he traveled to Afghanistan to undergo paramilitary
training while living in an Al Qaeda guesthouse.43 He eventually met
33. 10 U.S.C. § 950t (2006).
34. Id. § 950v(28) (2006) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 950t(29) (2012)).
35. 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2006) (emphasis added).
36. Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d. at 17.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
38. Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d at 17-18 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)).
39. See, e.g., Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 44 (1990); Mallet v. North Carolina, 181
U.S. 589, 597 (1901).
40. Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bahlul I, 767 F.3d 1.
41. Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d at 7.




Bin Laden in person and swore a loyalty oath to him.4 4 Bahlul began
working in Al Qaeda's media branch, where he produced a propaganda
film about the bombing of USS Cole (DDG 67). This video impressed
Bin Laden and prompted Bahlul's promotion to personal assistant and
public relations secretary.45
During the planning of the 9/11 attacks, Bahlul volunteered to
be one of the hijackers.46 Bin Laden denied his request due to Bahlul's
value as Al Qaeda's public relations secretary.47 He was permitted,
however, to play several other significant roles in the attack. He
administered loyalty oaths and prepared martyr-will videos for
Mohamed Atta, the leader of the operation within the United States,
and Ziad al Jarrah, one of the pilots.4 8 On the day of the attacks, Bahlul
operated a radio for Bin Laden to monitor their success; afterward, he
researched and prepared a report for Bin Laden on the economic impact
of the attacks.49 The United States later detained and prosecuted
Bahlul after allies captured him in Pakistan.50
A military commission originally convicted Bahlul under the
MCA of material support for terrorism, soliciting terrorism, and
conspiracy to commit terrorism.5 1 He challenged all three convictions
on the ground that they violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because they
were not law-of-war offenses as referenced by UCMJ Article 21 at the
time of his actions. The government conceded that neither material
support nor solicitation were law-of-war offenses-neither domestically
nor internationally-at the time of Bahlul's actions.52 Thus, the D.C.
Circuit overturned his convictions for those charges,53 and the focus of
the litigation became the constitutionality of his conspiracy
conviction.54
In Bahlul I, the D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
Bahlul's conspiracy conviction via two independent routes.55 First, it
44. Id.
45. Id. at 5-6.




50. Id. Bahlul has consistently admitted to all of the factual allegations recounted here. Id.
at 7. In fact, the only allegation by the government that he denied was wearing a suicide vest as a
bodyguard to Usama Bin Laden. Id.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id. at 27, 30.
53. Id. at 5. The D.C. Circuit hears all appeals from military commissions after they pass
through the Court of Military Commission Review ("CMCR").
54. See generally id.
55. Id. at 18.
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held that conspiracy to kill Americans abroad was already criminalized
under 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b), and neither the change in forum (from
federal court to military commission) nor the change in the statute
under which he was charged (from § 2332(b) to the MCA) constituted a
clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.56 Second, it held that the
UCMJ already authorized military commissions to try violations of the
law of war.5 7 The court then considered the content of the law of war,
asking whether it means purely the international law of war, or
whether it includes what the government referred to as the "common
law of war developed in U.S. military tribunals."58 As the court put it,
"The answer is critical because the Government asserts that conspiracy
is not an international law-of-war offense."59
56. Id. This Note will not directly address the D.C. Circuit's reasoning regarding 10 U.S.C.
§ 2332(b). See id. at 18-22. Arguably, it provides an even stronger case for upholding Bahlul's
conspiracy conviction than the Article 21 route. It suffers from a potential weakness, however, in
that it may never get off the ground: the court's necessary first move was that it was not "plain
error" to try Bahlul in a military commission for a crime that was exclusively within the
jurisdiction of Article III courts at the time Bahlul committed it. Id. at 19-20. Although the court
characterized the change in forum as merely a procedural change, id. at 19, its reasoning implicitly
expanded on the precedent it cited. While military commissions have a panel of "members" that in
a practical sense resemble a jury, they are not ordinarily considered to be equivalent to a trial by
jury of one's peers. E.g., Anthony F. Renzo, Making aBurlesque of the Constitution: Military Trials
of Civilians in the War Against Terrorism, 31 VT. L. REV. 447, 460 (2007) ("By their very nature
[military commissions] are the antithesis of a civilian jury in a civilian court with an independent
Article III judge presiding."); see Maryellen Fullerton, Hijacking Trials Overseas: The Need for an
Article III Court, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 21 (1986) ("A court-martial is tried, not by a jury of
the defendant's peers. . . , but by a panel of officers."). The court pointed out that a change in size
of the jury is not an ex post facto violation (although it was once considered to be one). Bahlul I,
767 F.3d at 19. However, it did not appear to consider that the removal from a jury-trial forum
entirely would violate Bahlul's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury of his peers (if he has that
right), which he would have had in the Article III court that had jurisdiction to try offenses of
§ 2332(b). U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Even if the court considers the members of a military
commission the practical equivalent of a jury, there is a reasonable argument that American
military officers are not Bahlul's peers. 152 Cong. Rec. 20732 (2006) (statement of Rep. Kucinich)
("The jury of commissioned military officers are not peers of these detainees."); see Fullerton,
supra; Renzo, supra. Finally, and perhaps most powerfully, the § 2332(b) argument is vulnerable
to the exact line of reasoning that led the panel to invalidate Bahlul's conviction on Article III
grounds. See generally Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Analyzing the problem under Article
21 avoids the forum-change problem entirely because it empowered military commissions to try
offenses of the law of war at the time of Bahlul's conduct. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). See also Bahlul
I, 767 F.3d at 77-78 (expressing "serious doubts" about Congress's authority to retroactively
authorize prosecution in military commissions for federal offenses).
57. See supra note 11.
58. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 22-23.
59. Id. at 23 (emphasis in original). This Note offers a different interpretation. In conceding
this point, the government engages in the same simple analysis as Bahlul's defense. As this Note
will argue, however, conspiracy is an international law of war offense, albeit in a different
structural form from the traditional American notion of conspiracy. See infra Sections III.B.1 and
III.C.2.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The D.C. Circuit declined to conclusively rule on this issue due
to the standard of review that it elected to apply.60 Holding that it was
not "plain error" to rely on the U.S. common law of war, the court relied
exclusively on domestic precedent to find that conspiracy existed as a
violation of the law of war at the time of Bahlul's actions.61 It upheld
his conspiracy conviction despite Bahlul's Ex Post Facto challenge and
remanded to the original three-member panel to consider alternative
challenges to the conspiracy conviction.62
Those challenges included Bahlul's contention that Congress
violated Article III of the Constitution by granting military
commissions jurisdiction over an offense that is not part of the
international law of war.6 3 Bahlul argued that the Constitution vests
the judicial power of the United States in Article III courts.64 Thus, any
proceeding within this judicial power (including criminal cases) must
be heard by an Article III court only, subject to a very limited set of
exceptions.65 One of those exceptions is that Congress may assign
prosecutions for law-of-war offenses to military commissions.66 From
that point, the issue turns on the same question raised by the Ex Post
Facto issue: are the law-of-war offenses over which Congress may grant
commissions jurisdiction limited to those defined in international law,
or do they include offenses established by domestic precedent?67
On remand, both Bahlul and the government reprised their
arguments from the Ex Post Facto challenge, with the government
arguing that the exception to Article III for military commission
jurisdiction over violations of the "law of war" includes the domestic
60. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 24. See also Jonathan Hafetz, Guest Post: The D.C. Circuit's En
Banc Ruling in Al Bahlul: Legal Innovation, Tradition, and America's Domestic Common Law of
War, OPINIO JURIS (July 22, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/07/22/guest-post-d-c-
circuits-en-banc-ruling-al-bahlul-legal-innovation-tradition-americas-domestic-common-law-war
[http://perma.cc/GGP3-WAXN] (noting that the court gave no clear resolution on the status of
conspiracy as a violation of the law of war).
61. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 24.
62. Id. at 31.
63. Id.
64. Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
65. Id.
66. See id. at 7-8 (delimiting the exceptions to the requirement that Article III courts preside
over cases within the judicial power); id. at 8 (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46 (1942)) ("The
Supreme Court held that the law of war military commission had jurisdiction to try 'offense[s]
against the law of war.' ").
67. Compare Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d at 22 ("What body of law is encompassed by section 821's
reference to the 'law of war'? That dispute takes center stage here."), with Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at
10 ('The question, therefore, is whether a law of war military commission may try domestic
offenses--specifically conspiracy-without intruding on the judicial power in Article III.").
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common law,68 and Bahlul arguing that it was limited to the
international law of war.69 The panel reviewed this challenge de novo
rather than for plain error because it "presents a structural violation of
Article III and is [therefore] not waivable or forfeitable," unlike the Ex
Post Facto challenge.70 Under the de novo standard of review, the panel
revived its holding from Hamdan II-potentially cast into doubt by the
en banc decision-that he "law of war" means international law only.7 1
It then concluded that a military commission cannot constitutionally be
granted jurisdiction over conspiracy because it is not a violation of the
international law of war and therefore is not within the exception to
Article 111.72 The conviction was vacated, and the government is now
almost certain to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari in an effort
to save it.7 3
C. Article III and Ex Post Facto: Two Issues, One Argument
The reason why the substantive arguments are nearly identical
for both the Article III and Ex Post Facto issues lies in the analytical
structure that each requires. Answering the Article III question
requires a two-step analysis: First, where does Article III establish the
limit of military-commission jurisdiction?74 Second, was conspiracy
already extant within that limit when Bahlul acted?75 Answering the
Ex Post Facto question requires a nearly identical exercise: First, what
is the limit of the law of war criminalized at the time of Bahlul's actions
68. Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 10.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id. But see id. at 29 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (arguing that plain error is the proper
standard of review for Bahlul's Article III challenge).
71. Id. at 8-9.
72. Id. at 22.
73. Lyle Denniston, Appeals court sharply narrows war crimes prosecutions, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 12, 2015, 3:09 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/appeals-court-sharply-narrows-war-
crimes-prosecutions/ [http://perma.cc/EF55-35S9]; Jens David Ohlin, Will Al-Bahlul's Appeal of
his Conspiracy Conviction go to the Supreme Court?, OPINIO JURIS (June 15, 2015, 2:00 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/06/15/will-al-bahluls-appeal-of-his-conspiracy-conviction-go-to-the-
supreme-court/ [http://perma.cclQ8CX-9C58].
74. See Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 10 ("The question, therefore, is whether a law of war military
commission may try domestic offenses-specifically conspiracy-without intruding on the judicial
power in Article III.").
75. See id. at 7-8 ("[T]he question is whether conspiracy falls within the Article III exception
for that type of commission.").
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under UCMJ Article 21?76 Second, did conspiracy exist within that limit
when Bahlul acted?77
There is, however, one critical but easily overlooked difference
between these analyses. The Ex Post Facto analysis calls for statutory
interpretation of the meaning of the "law of war." The Court would
decide whether, as a matter of statute, UCMJ Article 21 incorporates
only international law into federal law or also includes the American
common law of war. Congress could respond to such a ruling by
amending the statute-indeed, it did so with the MCA, which is why
the Ex Post Facto issue only calls into question conspiracy convictions
for pre-2006 conduct. By contrast, the Article III analysis calls for
constitutional interpretation of the meaning of the "law of war."78 Such
an interpretation would irrevocably set the jurisdictional boundary for
law-of-war military commissions absent a constitutional amendment.79
Therefore, while the substantive arguments are similar, the stakes are
much higher for the Article III issue. Accordingly, it seems best to
resolve both questions without making a final determination on the
meaning of the "law of war" for Article III purposes, if possible.
One way to do so is to adopt the most restrictive statutory
interpretation of the "law of war" in UCMJ Article 21. At the time of
Bahlul's actions, Article 21 criminalized at least the international law
of war,80 and Article III grants military commissions jurisdiction over
at least the international law of war.81 If the Court finds that the MCA's
definition of conspiracy was not already criminalized under the
international law of war, then while that would answer the Ex Post
Facto question, the Court would still need to proceed to the question of
how far beyond the international law of war Congress may
constitutionally expand the jurisdiction of law-of-war military
commissions in order to determine conspiracy's viability for post-2006
76. See Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("What body of law is encompassed by section
82 1's reference to the 'law of war'?").
77. See id. ("We must therefore ascertain whether conspiracy to commit war crimes was a
'law of war' offense triable by military commissions under section 821 when Bahlul's conduct
occurred.").
78. Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 28 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
79. See id.
80. See Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 22-23 (framing the issue as whether the 'law of war" means
international law "full stop" or also includes "the common law of war developed in U.S. military
tribunals") (internal quotation omitted).
81. See Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 24-25 (Tatel, J., concurring) (characterizing the issue as
whether Article III limits military-commission jurisdiction to international law or also includes
"crimes recognized only by domestic law").
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conduct.82 However, if the Court determines that the MCA's definition
of conspiracy is within the statutory limitation of the international law
of war established by UCMJ Article 21, then it must by definition also
be within the constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of law-of-war
military commissions, which extends at least as far as international
law. It would therefore be unnecessary to determine whether the Article
III exception stops there or grants Congress more leeway.
The alternative route to upholding the constitutionality of the
MCA's conspiracy charge involves overturning the D.C. Circuit's ruling
on the Article III issue in Bahlul II. Even if the Supreme Court were to
find the MCA's conspiracy charge constitutional, the utility of such a
holding would be limited-it would only reinstate the uncertain
landscape left by the D.C. Circuit's Bahlul I decision. Under a "plain
error" standard of review, courts and attorneys will remain unsure
about the viability of conspiracy for pre-2006 conduct.83 Additionally, if
the Court overturns Bahlul II while applying the "plain error" standard
of review to the Article III question (as Judge Henderson would do),84 it
would not only restore that uncertainty but also reproduce it in the
constitutional realm.
If the Supreme Court affirms the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Bahlul II, then it has no occasion to revisit the Ex Post Facto question.
82. See Charlie Savage, Guantdnamo Detainee's Conviction is Thrown Out on Appeal, N.Y.
TIMES, (June 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/us/ruling-finds-tribunal-is-no-place-
for-guantanamo-detainees-case.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/57QE-YD3E] (noting that while the en
banc decision was focused on pre-2006 conduct, the panel decision regarding the Article III
challenge also invalidates conspiracy for future acts). The viability of conspiracy for post-2006
conduct is of more than academic concern; at least one person currently faces conspiracy charges
for post-2006 conduct. Id.; see also Charlie Savage, Guantdnamo Bay Prosecutors Accuse Detainee
of Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/us/guantanamo-
bay-prosecutors-accuse-detainee-of-conspiracy.html [http://perma.ccl564B-PHRR] (noting the
addition of a conspiracy charge against Abd al Hadi al Iraqi). More individuals could potentially
face the same charges if the MCA's conspiracy provision is not invalidated.
83. Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d at 62 (Brown, J., concurring); Jonathan Hafetz, Guest Post, supra note
60 (noting that the court gave no clear resolution on the status of conspiracy as a violation of the
law of war). Granted, Brigadier General Mark Martins, the current Chief Prosecutor of Military
Commissions, has creatively minimized future repercussions by amending all charges stemming
from pre-2006 conduct to include conspiracy only as a mode of liability rather than as a standalone
offense. See Remarks by Chief Prosecutor Mark Martins at Guantanamo Bay (Jan. 27, 2013) at 2,
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/562514/27-jan-2013-statement-of-the-chief-prosecutor.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9QAV-9572] (announcing his recommendation to drop conspiracy as an
independent charge and use it as a mode of liability); Remarks by Chief Prosecutor Mark Martins
at Guantanamo Bay (Oct. 25, 2013) at 1, http://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-
public/uploads/2013/10/25-October-2013-Statement-of-the-Chief-Prosecutor.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9YK7-G6DE] (noting judge's grant of motion to supplement brief seeking
amendment of charges). This, however, is a symptom of the problem, not a solution. It reacts to
the legal issue, but does not resolve it.
84. Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 29.
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However, if it upholds the constitutionality of the MCA's conspiracy
charge, the best route by which to do so is via the Ex Post Facto
analysis. Assuming the most restrictive statutory interpretation in
finding that the statute is constitutional resolves both challenges at
once and frees the Court from having to engage in binding
constitutional interpretation on a separation-of-powers question that
impacts foreign policy and national security.85
III. THE CONVOLUTED WORLD OF CONSPIRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD
The constitutionality of the MCA's conspiracy provision under
the Ex Post Facto Clause turns on whether it criminalizes anything that
was not already criminalized by UCMJ Article 21's incorporation of the
law of war.8 6 The predominant understanding is that if "law of war"
means the international law of war, then retroactive application of the
MCA's conspiracy provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.87 Section
III.A explores this contention by discussing the purpose of ex post facto
protection and principles by which that purpose is realized.
Section III.B adopts the more restrictive approach of assuming
that the law of war is limited to international law. It begins with an
overview of the status of conspiracy in international law and highlights
the key way in which the MCA is different. Then, it challenges the
85. Id. at 28. Additionally, those who argue that the "law of war" in Article 21 means
international law arguably have a stronger basis in precedent. In declining to decide the issue, the
en banc court relied primarily on disagreement between Supreme Court Justices in a single, recent
case: Hamdan I, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). The majority pointed out that the Hamdan Court did not
resolve the question of what the "law of war" encompasses. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 22. While they
also managed to find ambiguity in most of the other cases that reached the issue, id. at 23-24,
when addressing the question directly the Supreme Court has consistently considered the law of
war to mean the international law of war. Hamdan 1, 548 U.S. at 641 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[Tihe law of war ... is the body of international law governing armed conflict."); Madsen v.
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 354-55 (1952) ('The 'law of war' . . . includes at least that part of the law
of nations which defines the powers and duties of belligerent powers occupying enemy territory
pending the establishment of civil government."); Yamashita v. Styer (In re Yamashita), 327 U.S.
1 (1946); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942) (describing the law of war as a "branch of
international law"); Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 14 (1866) ('The laws of war are the laws which
govern the conduct of belligerents towards each other and other nations, flagranti bello."); Bahlul
I, 767 F.3d at 37 (Rogers, J., dissenting) ("For more than seventy years, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the 'law of war' to mean the international law of war."); see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (citing Geneva Conventions as source of law of war); The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 698 (1900) (treating the law of war as a part of international law).
86. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 22 ("We must therefore ascertain whether conspiracy to commit
war crimes was a 'law of war' offense triable by military commission under section 821 when
Bahlul's conduct occurred because, if so, Bahlul's ex post facto argument fails.").
87. E.g., id. at 22-23 (indicating that the government agrees with Bahlul's contention that
conspiracy is not an international law-of-war offense).
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predominant understanding that, because of that difference, the MCA
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Section III.C delves deeper into the analysis, showing that the
predominant understanding conflates two different concepts regarding
conspiracy: (1) the inchoate nature of conspiracy as a standalone
offense, and (2) the factual possibility of an inchoate conspiracy.
Understanding the difference between these concepts elucidates how, if
at all, the MCA might violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
A. Ex Post Facto Is About Conduct and Notice of Criminality
The Ex Post Facto Clause is founded on the principle of legality,
a foundational legal principle stating that "no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed."88 The prohibition on ex post facto laws
serves two purposes. As the Supreme Court has explained, "Through
this prohibition, the Framers sought to assure that legislative Acts give
fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their
meaning until explicitly changed. The ban also restricts governmental
power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation."89
Thus, the Clause helps ensure that citizens have notice of what conduct
is criminal and that the government applies the criminal law fairly.
In order to fulfill those purposes, the Ex Post Facto Clause
consists of two primary prohibitions.90 First, and most intuitively, it
prohibits retroactive creation of new crimes.9' Behavior that was
88. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 347, 351 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality,
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1985) ("The principle
of legality forbids the retroactive definition of criminal offenses."); see also Peter Margulies,
Defining, Punishing, and Membership in the Community of Nations: Material Support and
Conspiracy Charges in Military Commissions, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (2013).
89. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1981) (citations omitted).
90. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). As formulated in Calder there are actually
four prohibitions:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law
that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed
to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence,
and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.
Id. The second, third, and fourth of these will all be treated as one for purposes of this Note,
because they all amount to substantive changes that are legalistic in nature. In fact, the Supreme
Court has described them as "mirror images of one another." Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533
(2000).
91. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
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entirely legal at the time the actor engaged in it cannot later be
criminalized and used against him.92 This prong of protection-the
conduct prong-does not concern technical changes in the name of that
conduct.93 Rather, its purpose is to ensure that individuals have
sufficient notice of what behavior is criminal and to allow them to rely
on that notice in acting.94 In essence, people should not be held
criminally responsible for actions they could not have known to be
criminal. Importantly, that also implies the converse: actions
recognized as criminal give rise to criminal liability due to notice of
their criminality. Thus, what matters in terms of ex post facto is the
conduct itself, not the precise legal language used to describe it.95
On the international level, the application of the legality
principle to underlying conduct, rather than specific statutory
provisions, is widespread and apparent as a matter of international
law.96 There, the legality principle is embodied in the phrase nullem
crimen sine lege.97 From the first great foray into international criminal
responsibility, at Nuremberg in the wake of the Second World War, the
international community has recognized that criminals cannot hide
behind the legality principle. In other words, they cannot avoid
responsibility for conduct they knew to be criminal under one law just
because they happen to be indicted under a different statutory provision
that was not yet codified at the time they acted.98
Indeed, international tribunals have wrestled with the legality
principle more extensively than domestic courts.99 Due to the often
indeterminate nature of international law, the legality principle has
been raised frequently and argued extensively in international
92. Id. ("[T]he plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is this; that the
Legislatures of the several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done by a subject, or citizen,
which shall have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for having done it.").
93. Id. (contrasting the literal meaning, prohibition on any retroactive laws, with the "plain
and obvious meaning," that conduct should not be retroactively criminalized).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 44 (1990); Mallet v. North Carolina 181 U.S.
589, 597 (1901). While numerous sources clearly state that criminalizing previously innocent
conduct does violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, it is surprisingly difficult to find any explicit
statement of the converse: statutes that criminalize conduct that is already criminalized elsewhere
in the Code do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Although that proposition logically follows
from the definition of ex post facto laws, the Author has been unable to find any concise, explicit
statement of it in the case law or secondary sources.
96. ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON & ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 17 (2d ed. 2010).
97. "There is no crime without law." Id. at 19 n.87.
98. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
99. CRYER ETAL., supra note 96, at 17.
1384 [Vol. 68:5:1367
2015] RESOLVING THE MCA CONSPIRACY PROBLEM
tribunals. 100 In these venues, the legality principle has been interpreted
entirely as a matter of whether the actor knew he was committing
wrongdoing at the time he acted. 101 The Nuremberg Tribunal described
the principle as follows:
The maxim nullem crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a
principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties
and assurances have attacked neighbouring States without warning is obviously untrue,
for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from
it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong was allowed to go
unpunished.10 2
Thus, the core concern of the legality principle is the defendant's
conduct and mental state, rather than the precise wording used to
describe them or the prior existence of the particular statute under
which the defendant is charged.
Returning to the domestic level, the second prong of protection
provided by the Ex Post Facto Clause-the legal prong-is a prohibition
on retroactive removal of elements that the government must prove in
crimes that already exist.103 This aspect is legalistic in nature because
it concerns the definition of the crime. The concern here is that "the
government subverts the presumption of innocence by reducing the
number of elements it must prove to overcome that presumption."10 4
Even if the conduct was already criminalized, it is fundamentally unfair
for the government to change the rules after the fact to suit its own
purposes.105 This applies apart from the notice requirement, and it
carries force even when the defendant's factual guilt seems obvious.106
For the MCA to pass an Ex Post Facto examination, it must
satisfy both the conduct and legal prongs. This Note next analyzes
whether the MCA's conspiracy statute violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause, starting with the prevailing argument offered by those who
believe it does.
100. Id. at 17-20.
101. Id. at 18-19.
102. Nuremberg IMT Judgment (1947), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 217.
103. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (fourth formulation described); Bahlul I,
767 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 532 (2000)) (stating that
removal of an element violates the Ex Post Facto Clause).
104. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 532.
105. Id. at 533.
106. Id. (discussing the case of Sir John Fenwick, who was quite clearly guilty of the offense
charged but was saved by an evidentiary rule that Parliament attempted to retroactively change
in violation of the ex post facto principle).
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B. The Typical Argument
Many scholars conclude-and the D.C. Circuit in Bahlul I
appears to have assumed-that because conspiracy does not exist as a
standalone offense in international law, the MCA's retroactive
criminalization of conspiracy violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if the
"law of war" is limited to international law. 107 Assuming that the "law
of war" is so limited, this Section explains the difference between
conspiracy in international law and in the MCA and briefly recounts
the conclusion argued by Bahlul and apparently assumed by the D.C.
Circuit.
1. Conspiracy in International Law
Conspiracy first appeared in the international law of war in the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal ("IMT") at Nuremberg
following World War 11.108 However, its inclusion was controversial and,
essentially, a concession to the American delegation because they had
framed their entire case against the Nazis as a vast conspiracy.109 In
the end, conspiracy charges were dismissed for all crimes except
conspiracy to commit the crime of aggression, due to its "inherently
conspiratorial nature."110
In the Nuremberg IMT, conspiracy was used not as an
independent offense but as a mode of liability.111 A mode of liability is
simply a form of participation in an offense that gives rise to criminal
liability for that offense.112 A familiar example within American
107. E.g., Glazier, supra note 32, at 331; Jonathan Hafetz, Policing the Line: International
Law, Article III, and the Constitutional Limits of Military Jurisdiction, 2014 Wis. L. REv. 681, 683
(2014); Vladeck, supra note 6, at 324-25. See Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 23 ("[The Government asserts
that conspiracy is not an international law-of-war offense.").
108. See CLAIRE DE THAN & EDWIN SHORTS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 276 (2003) ("[The IMTs] focused the world's attention, truly for the first time, not only on
the general principles of international law regarding war crimes, but also defined those crimes and
founded a proper forum to implement those laws."); CRYER ET AL., supra note 96, at 367 ('The
Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs both provided that those who participated in a 'common plan or
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any
person in execution of such a plan.' ").
109. ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 309 (2005).
110. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 279 (Antonio Cassese
ed., 2006). Conspiracy also featured prominently in the Tokyo IMT, where it was applied more
widely; CRYER ET AL., supra note 96, at 368.
111. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 96, at 368 ("The use of 'conspiracy' in this regard is
misleading as it is apt to cause confusion between this type of liability and the separate (common
law) offense of conspiracy.").
112. Stuart Ford, Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments, 39 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 45, 80 (2013) (quoting CRYER ET AL., supra note 96, at 361) ("Modes of
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jurisprudence-apart from direct commission of the crime-is aiding
and abetting. A person may be guilty of a crime he did not personally
commit because he assisted the perpetrator in some manner, either
before or after the fact.113 In such a case, while he would be guilty of the
underlying crime, the mode of liability is aiding and abetting.114
Since the days of the Nuremberg IMT, the term "conspiracy"
itself has largely disappeared from international law." 5 Conspiracy as
an independent crime (similar to the offense as used in American law)
exists only for genocide.116 Nevertheless, conspiracy modes of liability
have garnered widespread acceptance in international law under other
names.117
In cases for crimes committed in the early 1990s, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
developed and applied a mode of liability known as Joint Criminal
Enterprise ("JCE").118 There are two types of JCE, but both require: (1)
"a plurality of persons," (2) "the existence of a common plan, design or
purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime," and
(3) "participation of the accused in the common design."119
Notably, the bar for JCE is lower than for a domestic
conspiracyl20 in that the perpetrators need not make an express
agreement beforehand,121 although in practice an agreement is often
liability are principles of liability that 'apply across the various [substantive] offenses and provide
for the doctrines by which a person may commit, participate in, or otherwise be found responsible
for those crimes.' ").
113. E.g., United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 64 (1951) ("Aiding and abetting means to
assist the perpetrator of the crime.").
114. Cf. United States v. Marchan, 32 F. Supp. 3d 753, 761-62 (S.D. Tex. 2013) ("[Ajiding and
abetting ... is not a separate and distinct offense. Rather, [it] allows one who has been indicted as
a principal to be convicted on evidence that shows he merely aided and abetted offense.") (citing
United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 752 (5th Cir. 1998)).
115. See DE THAN & SHORTS, supra note 108, at 9 (2003) ("Conspiracy to commit offenses other
than genocide existed under the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters but has not been on the agenda
at ICTY or ICTR."). This is probably due in large part to the same sort of inherent conflation under
the term "conspiracy" of the inchoate nature of conspiracy as a standalone offense and the notion
of an inchoate conspiracy that will feature so prominently below in Part III.B.1.
116. CRYER ET AL., supra note 96, at 368.
117. E.g., Bahlul I, 767 F.3d 1, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Brown, J., concurring); THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 279.
118. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 392-
93.
119. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 1 227 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj705O7JT2-e.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4B9X-7VA3].
120. Throughout, the term "domestic conspiracy" will refer to the traditional American
conception of conspiracy.
121. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, at ¶ 227; CRYER ET AL., supra note 96, at 369.
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proven as the most conclusive evidence that a JCE existed.122 A
defendant's personal participation in the JCE need not involve a
criminal act.123 Like domestic conspiracy, if all the other elements of a
JCE are met, the defendant may incur individual responsibility through
a non-criminal act that contributes to or furthers the common plan.124
The required mental state depends on which type of JCE is
alleged. There are two primary types of JCE.125 The first requires
"intent to perpetrate a certain crime."12 6 The second requires "intent[ ]
to participate in and further the criminal activity or the criminal
purpose of a group and to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise
or . .. the commission of a crime by the group."12 7 Although these mental
states seem similar, the difference is that in the first one, the defendant
must intend to contribute to a particularized crime, whereas the second
one only requires a general intent to contribute to an overall criminal
goal. Domestic conspiracy may not include an express mental element,
but it does require the agreement to commit a crime,128 which
necessarily includes intent to perpetrate the crime.
Because JCE is only a mode of liability-not an independent
offense-once the JCE is established and the defendant is shown to be
a member thereof, a prosecutor must also prove that an underlying
122. E.g., Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1 612 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases[krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M4RT-JKVJ].
123. Tadie, Case No. IT-94-1-A, at ¶ 227.
124. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 392.
For example, it is not a crime under international law (or probably any law) for a general to
transfer a unit of combat engineers to another's command. However, if he knows that the receiving
commander needs those engineers in order to dig mass graves, he may incur individual criminal
liability under a JCE theory, even though transferring command of soldiers is, in itself, perfectly
legal. Cf., e.g., Prosecutor v. Blagojevid and Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 1 308 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
blagojevicjokic/tjugen/bla-050117e.pdf [http://perma.cclVT7K-GE82] (describing the Defendant's
transfer of a driver from one of his subordinate commands to a separate civilian command for the
purpose of burying war-crime victims in mass graves).
125. Prosecutor v. Kvo6ka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, 1 82 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvockalacjug/en/kvo-aj050228e.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5MUG-HJFU]. A third type, really a variant of the first, was designed to reach
low-level guards and other workers at concentration camps who may not know enough of the
details of the common plan to meet the requirements for the first category, but are fully aware
that they are contributing to the ongoing, systematic perpetration of crime(s). Id.; CRYER ET AL.,
supra note 96, at 369-71.
126. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, at 1 228; CRYER ETAL., supra note 96, at 371.
127. Tadid6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, at 1 228 (emphasis omitted).
128. See lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975) ("[Tihe essence of [conspiracy] is
an agreement o commit an unlawful act.").
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substantive crime occurred.129 This does not require showing that the
defendant himself committed the underlying substantive crime or any
other criminal act.130 As long as the government establishes that
someone in the JCE committed the underlying crime, the defendant
bears individual criminal responsibility for it.131
The elements of a JCE, taken together, show that it is a
conspiracy mode of liability. 132 It requires that the defendant, along
with at least one other person, create a common plan with intent to
commit a crime-essentially an agreement o commit a crime. Once the
plan is created, the defendant must participate in that plan by some
overt act, which need not be criminal and need not amount to personal
perpetration of the object offense-just as with conspiracy. And the
requirement to prove the underlying substantive crime, rather than
just the agreement, makes JCE a mode of liability rather than an
independent offense.
Other international tribunals have uniformly adopted the
concept of JCE from the ICTY. The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, presiding over crimes committed in 1994,133 considers JCE to
be a part of customary international law. 134 The Special Court for Sierra
Leone likewise held JCE to be a part of international law in a case
governing criminal conduct spanning from 1996 to 2002.135 Finally, the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia found that
customary international law included JCE as early as 1975.136
129. Cf. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at
395 ("The Tadi6 AC implicitly classified JCE liability as a form of 'commission.' "); CRYER ET AL.,
supra note 96, at 368 ("The substantive definitions of crimes provide only a part of the picture of
criminal liability. The general principles of liability apply across the various different offences and
provide for the doctrines by which a person may commit, participate in, or otherwise be found
responsible for those crimes.").
130. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, at 9 227.
131. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 96, at 361 ("[In international law, the paradigmatic
offender is often the person who orders, masterminds, or takes part in a plan at a high level.").
132. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at
391 (discussing JCE and referring to it as a version of the conspiracy mode of liability).
133. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 7 (Jan. 31, 2010).
134. E.g., Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-T, Judgment, 1 623 (Nov. 1,
2010), http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-02-78/trial-judgements/en/
101101.pdf [http://perma.cc/CTF4-QJEJ].
135. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, 1J 13, 458 (May 18, 2012),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/1283/SCSL-03-01-T-1283.pdf [http://perma.cc/
VH8W-CZ7V].





Additionally, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court ("ICC"), of which 139 states are signatories,137 describes what is
essentially a conspiracy mode of liability. 138 Article 25.3(d) of the Rome
Statute establishes criminal liability for a person who
in any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime
by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be
intentional and shall either:
(i) be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.
13 9
This is also essentially a conspiracy mode of liability. There must be a
group of persons with a common criminal purpose that the defendant
intends to further by his contribution. An explicit agreement is not
required, but any agreement to participate in the plan would
necessarily satisfy the requirement of intent to conspire. In other words,
requiring an agreement sets a higher bar than that set by the ICC
statute. The defendant must actually make some contribution to the
criminal purpose, but the contribution itself need not be illegal.
The uniform, widespread adoption of conspiracy modes of
liability in international law indicates that while the word "conspiracy"
is not often used, conspiracy as a mode of liability has been a feature of
international law since the end of the Second World War, and had
gained enough acceptance by 1998 to be included in the Rome Statute
of the ICC.1 4 0 The particulars of its codification have varied, but its
substance has not. Its elements can be fairly characterized as follows:
under international law, a person may be guilty of an offense via the
conspiracy mode of liability if he (1) makes an agreement with another
person or persons, (2) the object of which is to commit a violation of the
relevant body of law, and (3) he performs some overt act in furtherance
of that agreement.141 Additionally, because it is a mode of liability, at
137. United Nations Status for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src-TREATY&mtdsg-no=XVIII-10&chapter-18
&1ang-en (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) [http://perma.cclE556-FM9M]. While the United States is not
a Party to the Rome Statute, the Rome Statute, which contains a conspiracy mode of liability,
meets with near universal acceptance in the international community.
138. CRYER, supra note 109, at 315.
139. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25.3(d) (July 1, 2002). The Special
Tribunal for Lebanon included nearly identical language in its governing statute. Statute of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 3 (Jan. 31, 2007).
140. United Nations Status for the Rome Statute, supra note 137.
141. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 11 38-51 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-
e.pdf [http://perma.cc/4B9X-7VA3] (elements of JCE); Rome Statute of the International Criminal
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least one member of the conspiracy must carry out the intended
violation in order for there to be a crime at all.142
2. How the MCA Is Different
In contrast to international law, domestic conspiracy is treated
as an independent offense for which liability accrues as soon as any
conspirator takes an action, even a legal one, in furtherance of the
conspiracy. 143 For example, the federal offense of conspiracy under Title
18 of the U.S. Code is defined as follows:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose,
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 144
The offense has three elements, which mirror the elements of the
conspiracy mode of liability: (1) making an agreement to commit an
offense (2) against the United States, and (3) doing an act to effect the
object of the conspiracy.145 Once those elements are satisfied, the offense
is complete, even if the object of the conspiracy is never even
attempted.146
Completion of the offense, and thus accrual of liability, without
an attempt is the primary difference between domestic conspiracy and
conspiracy as a mode of liability. Without the occurrence of the
underlying crime, the act of conspiring to commit that crime is not itself
a violation of international law.147 Under the domestic conception, the
opposite is true: the act of conspiring is itself illegal, even if the
Court, art. 25.3(d) (elements of conspiracy analogue in the Rome Statute); CRYER ET AL., supra
note 96, at 367 (noting inclusion of "common plan or conspiracy" in the Nuremberg and Tokyo
IMTs); see also THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at
392 (stating that the ICTY understood its JCE theory to be a reflection of customary international
law); CRYER ET AL., supra note 96, at 369 (same).
142. Cf. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at
395 ("The Tadi6 AC implicitly classified JCE liability as a form of 'commission.' "); CRYER ET AL.,
supra note 96, at 368 ("The substantive definitions of crimes provide only a part of the picture of
criminal liability. The general principles of liability apply across the various different offences and
provide for the doctrines by which a person may commit, participate in, or otherwise be found
responsible for those crimes.").
143. E.g., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at
279.
144. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
145. United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.
Schmick, 904 F.2d 936, 941 (5th Cir. 1990)).
146. E.g., United States v. Massey, 827 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir. 1987); THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 279.
147. E.g., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at
279.
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underlying crime never occurs.148 The other significant difference is
that when conspiracy is used as a mode of liability, the charge is not for
conspiracy but for the substantive crime itself.149 One cannot be guilty
of conspiracy under international law; rather, one is guilty of, say,
murdering civilians by reason of having conspired with the person who
actually pulled the trigger.150
The MCA's definition of conspiracy seemingly follows the
domestic pattern, requiring the accused only to conspire and commit
some overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy:
Any person subject to this chapter who conspires to commit one or more substantive
offenses triable by military commission under this chapter, and who knowingly does any
overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall be punished, if death results to one or
more of the victims, by death or such other punishment as a military commission under
this chapter may direct, and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such
punishment, other than death, as a military commission under this chapter may
direct. 151
The similarity of the first half of the statute to Title 18 conspiracy
reasonably supports an interpretation that the MCA's version of
conspiracy is the same. This notion is doubtlessly reinforced by
familiarity with the domestic conception of conspiracy. It is easy to
automatically interpret the MCA's use of the word "conspiracy" in the
way in which it has traditionally been used in other areas of American
law.152
3. The Premature Conclusion
Conspiracy's acceptance within international law only as a mode
of liability, coupled with the MCA's codification of it as an independent
offense, has led many scholars to conclude that the MCA's conspiracy
charge violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied retroactively. 153
In order for the MCA to survive an Ex Post Facto challenge, it may only
codify activity that was already criminalized elsewhere in federal
148. E.g., id.
149. E.g., Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/caseslkrstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf
[http://perma.cc[M4RT-JKVJ]; Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 11 38-51 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/ en/tad-
tsj70507JT2-e.pdf [http://perma.cc/4B9X-7VA3].
150. E.g., Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at 1138-51; Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-T, at 11 719, 721.
151. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(28) (2006) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 950t(29) (2012)).
152. See, e.g., Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 3, 11-12, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (interpreting-inaccurately,
as this Note will argue-the charge against Bahlul as one of inchoate conspiracy).
153. E.g., Bahlul I, 767 F.3d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Rogers, J., dissenting); Baldrate, supra
note 13, at 111; Glazier, supra note 13, at 154-55.
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law.154 UCMJ Article 21 criminalized violations of the law of war-
meaning the international law of war-but under international law,
conspiracy is not a distinct offense.155 It is only a mode of liability, which
still requires proving an underlying substantive crime.156 Thus,
scholars argue that because the MCA does not require proof of an
underlying crime, it criminalizes previously legal behavior (simply
conspiring without carrying out the crime), thereby violating the Ex
Post Facto Clause.157
Such simplicity is attractive. Ultimately, though, it turns out to
be too simple. It fails to recognize that not all conspiracies are the same,
even if they are charged as standalone offenses. As the next Section
reveals, at least one subclass of standalone conspiracies-those where
the underlying offense is actually carried out-describes the same
conduct as the conspiracy mode of liability in international law.
C. Delving Deeper
To justify the MCA's conspiracy charge under the Ex Post Facto
Clause, conspiracy as a standalone offense must be distinguished from
conspiracy as an inchoate crime. By comparing a defendant's conduct in
a standalone, completed conspiracy with a defendant's conduct in
conspiracy as a mode of liability, it becomes evident that the MCA does
not necessarily violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. It only does so if it is
interpreted to permit the government to charge conspiracy for a crime
that was never carried out.s5 8 However, criminalizing only completed
conspiracies-as in international law-does not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.
154. See, e.g., Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 18 (rejecting an Ex Post Facto challenge to the MCA
because the conduct was already criminalized elsewhere in federal law).
155. E.g., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at
279.
156. CRYER ET AL., supra note 96, at 367.
157. See, e.g., Hafetz, supra note 107, at 713 ('The type of inchoate liability under MCA-based
offenses such as MST and conspiracy exceeds even the most liberal interpretations of vicarious
liability by international tribunals."); Margulies, supra note 88, at 84 ("[C]onspiracy is a plausible
mode of liability in military commission cases, including al Bahlul. However, international law
and practice dim the prospects for charging conspiracy as a separate and independent offense.").
158. Cf. Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 3-22 (D.C. Cir. June 12, 2015) (consistently referring, in the




1. Standalone Conspiracy Does Not Equal Inchoate Conspiracy
There are two separate but related concepts regarding
conspiracy: (1) conspiracy as a standalone offense, and (2) the crime of
inchoate conspiracy. Conflating the two largely gives rise to the
perception that the MCA's conspiracy charge violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause.59 Both concepts are related to conspiracy's nature as an
"inchoate offense," which is "[a] step toward the commission of another
crime, the step in itself being serious enough to merit punishment."16 0
But standalone conspiracy refers to conspiracy's existence as a separate
offense from the underlying crime-in other words, its inchoate nature
itself-while inchoate conspiracy refers more specifically to the notion
that a defendant can be guilty of a conspiracy even when the underlying
object crime was never attempted.
Under American jurisprudence, conspiracy is a separate and
distinct crime from the underlying crime that is its object.161 Often,
when the underlying crime is carried out, conspiracy and the
underlying crime are charged together.16 2 However, this need not be the
case. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, "[T]he conspiracy to
commit an offense and the subsequent commission of that crime
normally do not merge into a single punishable act. [Therefore,] . . .
separate sentences can be imposed for the conspiracy to do an act and
for the subsequent accomplishment of that end."163 Given its separate
existence, conspiracy may be charged without charging the underlying
crime as well. Such a charge is referred to as a standalone conspiracy,
in contrast to conspiracy charged along with its object crime.164
Standalone conspiracy may be further broken down into two
categories. First, a defendant may be guilty of conspiracy even if the
object crime was never attempted.165 This is an inchoate conspiracy,
159. See id.
160. Inchoate Offense, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
161. E.g., lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975).
162. E.g., United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Snow, 48
F.3d 198, 200-01 (6th Cir. 1995); May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
United States v. DeSapio, 299 F. Supp. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Guterma, 189
F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
163. Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 777-78 (internal citations omitted).
164. See Patchen v. McGuire, No. 11-5388, 2012 WL 4473233, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012);
Margulies, supra note 88, at 88; Benjamin Wittes, The Lawfare Podcast Episode #23: Brig. Gen.
Mark Martins on His Decision to Drop Standalone Conspiracy Charges Against 9/11 Defendants,
LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-episode-23-brig-gen-
mark-martins-his-decision-drop-standalone-conspiracy-charges [http://perma.cclYML8Z8KA].
165. See United States v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing United States
v. Corley, 824 F.2d 931, 936 (11th Cir. 1987) ("[A]ttempt requires proof that a substantial step has
been taken towards completion of the crime, while conspiracy does not.")). This is in distinct
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which is merely a subset of standalone conspiracy. Conflating this
concept with standalone conspiracy itself leads many scholars and
courts to the conclusion that the MCA's conspiracy provision necessarily
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.166 The term inchoate conspiracy,
however, should be understood to refer specifically to a charge or
conviction for conspiracy for which the underlying crime was never
carried out, either because the conspirators changed their plans or
because they were arrested before they began their attempt.
In contrast, completed conspiracy is the subset of standalone
conspiracy in which a crime was successfully committed. Bahlul itself
provides an apt example.167 Completed conspiracy denotes that the
conspiracy achieved its object and has thus run its course, unlike an
inchoate conspiracy. 168 Thus, as a matter of the defendant's conduct and
the factual state of the world, there is no difference between charging a
completed conspiracy and charging conspiracy together with the
underlying crime. The only difference is a legal one: for a completed
conspiracy, the government need not prove all the elements of the
underlying crime in court.
Charging conspiracy as a standalone crime does not necessarily
equate to charging an inchoate conspiracy. The inchoate nature of
conspiracy allows it to be charged for inchoate conspiracies, but it also
allows conspiracy to be charged as its own offense for completed
conspiracies. This distinction is the key to showing that the MCA's
conspiracy provision does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
2. Completed Conspiracy Matches Conspiracy as a Mode of Liability
Comparing the conduct constituting a completed standalone
conspiracy with that constituting conspiracy as a mode of liability
reveals that the two concepts criminalize the same conduct.
Accordingly, the MCA does not criminalize anything new to military
commissions, but rather mirrors what is already understood to be part
of the international "law of war."
contrast from aiding and abetting, which "unlike conspiracy, is not a separate and distinct offense."
United States v. Marchan, 32 F. Supp. 3d 753, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (citing United States v.
Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 752 (5th Cir. 1998)).
166. See supra note 158.
167. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Grimm, 738 F.3d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 2013) (using "completed
conspiracy" to refer to a conspiracy that was carried out); United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 10
(1st Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d. 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2013) (same);
United States v. Stein, 249 F. Supp. 873, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (same); see also United States v.




To prove conspiracy as a mode of liability under international
law, a person must (1) make an agreement with another person or
persons, (2) the object of which is to commit a violation of the relevant
body of law, and (3) perform some overt act in furtherance of that
conspiracy.169 Additionally, at least one member of the conspiracy must
actually carry out the intended violation in order for there to be a
chargeable crime via a conspiracy mode of liability. 170
In a completed standalone conspiracy, the first three elements
are identical. 71 Additionally, some member(s) of the conspiracy must
actually carry out the intended violation in order for the conspiracy to
be completed.172 In either case, the defendant's conduct is the same.
Accordingly, a statute that criminalized only completed conspiracies as
a standalone offense would only criminalize conduct that was already
criminal under international law, and would therefore comply with the
Ex Post Facto Clause. As the next Section shows, the MCA is just such
a statute.
3. Correctly Characterizing the Ex Post Facto Violation
The crucial difference between conspiracy as a mode of liability
and a standalone charge for completed conspiracy has nothing to do
with the defendant's conduct. The difference is whether the underlying
crime must be proven in court. In either case, the defendant's conduct
that must be proven is the same. Conspiracy as a mode of liability,
however, additionally requires a fourth element: some member of the
conspiracy must actually carry out the intended violation.173 Generally,
however, for a standalone charge of conspiracy, even a completed one,
that element is absent.174 Thus, at first glance, it appears that
169. See supra Section III.B.1.
170. See supra Section III.B.1.
171. See supra Section III.C.2. In concurrence, Judge Rogers suggests in Bahlul I that the
overt act committed by the accused must itself be a law-of-war offense. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d at 50
(Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is not supported by the language of the
MCA, which requires that he "knowingly do[] any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy."
10 U.S.C. § 950v(28) (2006).
172. See supra Section III.C.2.
173. Cf. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at
395 ("The Tadi AC implicitly classified JCE liability as a form of 'commission.' "); CRYER AT AL.,
supra note 96, at 368 ("The substantive definitions of crimes provide only a part of the picture of
criminal liability. The general principles of liability apply across the various different offences and
provide for the doctrines by which a person may commit, participate in, or otherwise be found
responsible for those crimes.").
174. E.g., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at
279.
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conspiracy as a mode of liability under international law has an element
that conspiracy under the MCA lacks.
The entire difference between standalone conspiracy and
conspiracy as a mode of liability lies in lack of a need to prove that
fourth element. Indeed, it is this very difference that permits
convictions for the subcategory of inchoate conspiracies. It would be
logically impossible to convict someone for a conspiracy that was never
carried out if an element of the conspiracy charge was proving that
someone had carried out the object crime. Even with inchoate
conspiracies, however, the government must prove the same conduct
with respect to the defendant as for completed conspiracies and for
conspiracy as a mode of liability.' 75 The factual difference is whether
that conspiracy is carried out; the legal difference is whether the
conspiracy's completion must be proven in court.
That legal difference in turn affects notice of criminality, which
implicates ex post facto concerns. Conspiracy as a mode of liability puts
people on notice that their acts will incur criminal liability when the
conspiracy is completed. Criminalization of standalone conspiracy puts
people on notice that their acts will incur criminal liability when they
take any overt action in furtherance of the conspiracy, which could be
an otherwise innocuous act occurring far earlier in time.176 The former
is simply a description of the pre-MCA content of international law. The
latter, however, captures inchoate conspiracies and therefore adds
criminality outside the scope of international law.
Consequently, if the MCA retroactively criminalizes all
standalone conspiracies-both completed and inchoate-it violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause. But the violation does not arise from the MCA's
retroactive criminalization of completed conspiracies, such as the one
at issue in Bahlul. Rather, it arises only from its retroactive
criminalization of inchoate conspiracies by way of criminalizing all
standalone conspiracies.17 7 However, if the MCA only criminalizes
175. All three require the conduct described in the previous Section: (1) make an agreement
with another person or persons, (2) the object of which is to commit a violation of the law of war,
and (3) perform some overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy.
176. United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.
Schmick, 904 F.2d 936, 941 (5th Cir. 1990)); THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 279.
177. See Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explicitly noting that the conspiracy
charges upheld in Quirin and Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1956), were completed
conspiracies). Although the D.C. Circuit panel attempted to distinguish Bahlul's case from the
cases that upheld completed conspiracies, it did so on the ground that Bahlul's individual actions
were not themselves war crimes. Id. However, what matters is not whether the defendant's
personal acts were criminal, but whether the underlying object of the conspiracy was a war crime.
See supra notes 130, 139, and accompanying text.
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completed conspiracies-not all standalone conspiracies-it does not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Unfortunately, the MCA's language
is similar to that of other conspiracy statutes that criminalize inchoate
conspiracy, and American jurisprudence has a long tradition of
conspiracy including both types of standalone conspiracy. But the MCA
need not be interpreted that way. As the next Part shows, the MCA's
text should be interpreted to coincide with international law while
preserving our domestic tradition of criminalizing conspiracy as a
standalone offense.178
IV. A TEXT-BASED INTERPRETATION THAT RESOLVES THE PROBLEM
Unlike other domestic conspiracy statutes, the language of the
MCA's conspiracy statute specifically contemplates completed
conspiracies by mentioning victims in both of its punishment
provisions. This language is unique among American definitions of
conspiracy, occurring only in the MCA and the one other statute within
the UCMJ that defines conspiracy in violation of the law of war. Thus,
the MCA's conspiracy statute provides a textual basis upon which to
interpret the MCA to criminalize only completed conspiracies, as only
completed conspiracies can possibly have victims. As such, the MCA
satisfies the conduct prong of ex post facto protection by aligning the
MCA with international law. Further, adopting such an interpretation
requires the government to demonstrate as a jurisdictional matter that
the underlying offense occurred. Doing so satisfies the ex post facto
prohibition on removing elements by recovering the one element of
conspiracy that is missing from the legal concept of a completed
standalone conspiracy: proving in court the completion of the
178. For an approach to this issue that leans more heavily on the Define and Punish Clause,
see Margulies, supra note 88. Judge Henderson's dissent from the panel decision hews closely to
Prof. Margulies's argument that the underlying conduct is the important factor. See Bahlul II, 792
F.3d at 41 (Henderson, J., dissenting) ("Bahlul's conduct was indisputably illegal under
international law, whether or not he was charged with an offense the international community
expressly recognizes."). Judge Henderson and Prof. Margulies argue that the Define and Punish
Clause gives Congress the power to define new crimes, not found in international law, so long as
the underlying conduct is the same. Id. at 44 (quoting Margulies, supra note 88). Where their
argument differs from that of this Note is in the distinction between standalone conspiracy and
inchoate conspiracy. See infra Part IV. In recognizing that the MCA criminalizes only completed
conspiracy, which is already criminalized under international aw, this Note avoids defending even
a slight congressional addition to current international law. The difference between international
law and the MCA, according to Henderson and Margulies, is mostly wording with a small
substantive innovation. See Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 43-44 (criticizing Bahlul's argument that the
crime must be found element-for-element in international law in favor of recognizing underlying
principles); id. at 44 (citing Margulies, supra note 88) (arguing that the Define and Punish Clause
permits Congress to contribute to the development of new international law). For this Note, the
difference between international law and the MCA is only the wording.
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conspiracy's object. Finally, this approach prohibits charging a person
with both conspiracy and the underlying crime under the MCA. If the
MCA's conspiracy charge is interpreted as a domestic codification of
what is a single, indivisible crime in international law, convictions for
both the underlying crime and the conspiracy cannot be permitted in
the way that they are under other domestic conspiracy statutes.
A. The MCA's Unique Language Contemplates Completed Conspiracies
The MCA's conspiracy statute differs from the general federal
conspiracy statute in one important way: both of the former's
punishment provisions assume the existence of victims of the
conspiracy.179 The statute states that those found guilty of conspiracy
shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death or such other
punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct, and, if death does
not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death, as a military
commission under this chapter may direct.1 8 0
There is no mention of victims in the general federal conspiracy statute
in Title 18, which requires only that the conspiracy be proven and
provides that conspirators "shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both."lsl
The reference to victims is just the textual hook needed to
indicate that the MCA is an accurate domestic codification of
international law. Unlike proving conspiracy as a mode of liability,
proving completed conspiracy as a standalone offense does not require
proving in court that the conspiracy was carried out.18 2 Simply reading
that element into the MCA without a textual basis would likely amount
to judicial legislation; however, the MCA's reference to victims
incorporates a completed conduct element and thereby provides the
necessary textual basis to interpret the MCA as criminalizing only
completed conspiracies.
Federal law defines a "crime victim" as "a person directly and
proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense
or an offense in the District of Columbia."1 83 For a "victim" to exist, two
requirements must be met: (1) an offense must have been committed,
and (2) a person must have been directly and proximately harmed by
179. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(28) (2006) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 950t(29) (2012)).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). Other conspiracy statutes similarly lack mention of victims. See
infra note 192.
182. See supra Sections III.B.3-4.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A) (2012).
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it.184 Black's Law Dictionary similarly defines "victim" as a "person
harmed by a crime, tort, or other wrong."185
There cannot be any victims of an inchoate conspiracy. Granted,
if inchoate conspiracy is an offense, the first element of the federal
definition of "victim" is clearly met. However, incomplete conspiracies
lack the second, more relevant factor. If the conspiracy is never carried
out, nobody can be "directly and proximately harmed by it." The same
is true for the Black's Law definition, which also requires harm to a
person.
The MCA presumes that there will be victims of the conspiracy.
It provides for punishment if the victims die and for punishment if the
victims do not die.186 However, it does not provide for punishment if
there are no victims.1 87 Because the MCA expects that there will be
victims, it necessarily follows that the MCA expects that the conspiracy
will be completed, as only completed conspiracies have victims.
The UCMJ's definition of conspiracy lends additional support for
interpreting the MCA's conspiracy statute to criminalize only
completed conspiracies. The UCMJ defines two different types of
conspiracy: (1) general conspiracy to commit an offense under the
UCMJ, and (2) conspiracy to commit an offense under the law of war. 188
These are codified as separate subsections of Article 81.189 The provision
for conspiracy to violate the UCMJ, like its Title 18 counterpart, does
not mention victims. However, conspiracy to violate the law of war
matches the MCA definition in assuming the presence of victims in all
of its punishment provisions.190 Moreover, the bill by which Congress
amended the UCMJ to reflect these two different types of conspiracy
was the MCA itself.191 This indicates that Congress was aware of the
184. Id.
185. Victim, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
186. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(28) (2006) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 950t(29) (2012)).
187. Id.
188. The statute reads:
(a) Any person subject o this chapter who conspires with any other person to commit
an offense under this chapter shall, if one or more of the conspirators does an act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who conspires with any other person to commit
an offense under the law of war, and who knowingly does an overt act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by
death or other such punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct,
and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death,
as a court-martial or military commission may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 881 (2012) (emphasis added).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 4(b), 120 Stat. 2631 (2006).
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difference between conspiracy under the international law of war and
the general domestic definition of conspiracy. Congress dealt with that
difference by defining conspiracy under the law of war to require
victims and thereby only criminalize completed conspiracies. The MCA
and UCMJ Article 81(b)-the only U.S. statutes that define conspiracy
under the law of war-are unique in American law in expecting the
presence of victims. No other state or federal definition of conspiracy
inherently expects the presence of victims or otherwise contains
language requiring completion of the object offense.192
Accordingly, the MCA should not be interpreted as defining a
new crime of inchoate conspiracy, but as simply codifying the existing
international law in a way that accords with the American tradition of
criminalizing conspiracy as an offense rather than a mode of liability.
Under this interpretation, inchoate conspiracies are not within the
MCA's definition of conspiracy. This resolves the potential conflict with
the conduct prong of ex post facto protection, because the MCA does not
define as criminal any conduct that was not already criminalized.
B. The Jurisdictional Requirement to Prove Completion
If the MCA is to survive the Ex Post Facto challenge, it must
also satisfy the Clause's legal prong. Although both completed
conspiracy and conspiracy as a mode of liability involve the same
conduct, the former lacks the element requiring proof that the
192. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012); id. § 241 (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012); ALA. CODE § 13A-4-3
(2014); ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.120 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-3-401 (2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-2-201 (2014);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-48 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 511-513 (2015); D.C. CODE § 22-
1805a (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04 (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-8 (2014); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 705-520 (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1701 (2014); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2 (2014); IND.
CODE § 35-41-5-2 (2014); IOWA CODE § 706.1 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5302 (2014); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 506.040 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:26 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A,
§ 151 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.157a (2014); MINN. STAT. § 609.175 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-1-1 (2014); Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.014 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-102 (2014); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-202 (2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:3 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2 (West 2015);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-2 (2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 105.00-105.17 (McKinney 2014); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-06-04 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 421
(2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.450 (2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-
410 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-8 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-103 (2014); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 15.02 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-201 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1404 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-22 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.28.040 (2014); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-10-31 (2014); WIS. STAT. § 939.31 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-303 (2014). Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, and Rhode Island lack a statutory definition for
conspiracy, but define it in the typical way at common law, regardless of presence of victims. Mason
v. State, 488 A.2d 955, 960 (Md. 1985); Commonwealth v. Corridori, 417 N.E.2d 969, 974 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1981); Nunnery v. Eighth Judicial Dist., 186 P.3d 886, 888 (Nev. 2008); State v. Horton,
170 S.E.2d 466, 469 (N.C. 1969); State v. Smith, 662 A.2d 1171, 1177 (R.I. 1995).
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conspiracy was carried out. Even if the MCA's definition of conspiracy
only describes completed conspiracies, there is still an Ex Post Facto
problem if the government is not required to prove that the conspiracy
was carried out.193 However, the MCA's jurisdictional restrictions show
how the government may be so required.
The MCA grants military commissions very limited "jurisdiction
to try any offense made punishable by [the MCA] or the law of war."19 4
Assuming the "law of war" means international law, this Note has
shown that inchoate conspiracies are not a violation thereof.195 Further,
this Note has shown that a proper interpretation of the MCA's
definition of conspiracy only encompasses completed conspiracies. This
means that only completed conspiracies are within the jurisdiction
granted to military commissions by the MCA-inchoate conspiracies
are not.
Therefore, when bringing a conspiracy charge under the MCA,
the government must prove as a jurisdictional matter that the crime
that was the object of the conspiracy was committed. The commission's
jurisdiction is fully contestable by the accused.196 While the government
only needs to establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence
in order for the commission to proceed,'97 a guilty verdict requires that
the commission members find jurisdiction is met beyond a reasonable
doubt.198 Establishing at the jurisdictional phase that the underlying
crime occurred does not make it an element of conspiracy per se. But it
does mean that during the course of litigation, the government must
necessarily prove all the same elements to achieve a conspiracy
conviction under the MCA at the same standard previously required
when applying international law under Article 21.199
Requiring the government to prove completion of the conspiracy
at the jurisdictional stage does not risk the jurisdictional stage
193. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
194. 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2006). The current version is largely the same, adding jurisdiction over
the UCMJ offenses of aiding the enemy and prisoner misconduct. 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2012).
195. CRYER ET AL., supra note 96, at 368.
196. See United States v. Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1238 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2007) (noting that
the Rules for Military Commissions permit the accused to move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
and that lack ofjurisdiction is a nonwaivable ground for dismissal at any stage of the proceedings).
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1182-83 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011),
rev'd on other grounds, Bahlul I, 767 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting that judge's instructions
required the members to find another jurisdictional requirement-the accused's status as an alien
unlawful enemy combatant-beyond a reasonable doubt in order to return a conviction).
199. Cf. Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d at 20-21 (stating that removal of an element does not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause when the court's findings necessarily include finding that the element was
met).
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swallowing the entire trial. It is not necessary at that point to prove any
of the other elements of the conspiracy or to present any evidence about
the defendant's involvement. Taking Bahlul's case as an example, the
object of the conspiracy in which he participated was the attacks on
9/11. Following the procedure recommended by this Note, the
government would charge that Bahlul participated in a conspiracy to
commit the 9/11 attacks. At the jurisdictional stage, the government
need only argue-and the commission need only find-that the 9/11
attacks in fact occurred. At that point, the commission would not need
to make any finding about the existence of a conspiracy to carry out the
attacks, the members of that conspiracy, or Bahlul's involvement.
However, by proving that the 9/11 attacks occurred, the government
would bring the case within the commission's jurisdiction to hear a
charge for a completed conspiracy as defined by the MCA. In order to
return a conviction, in addition to finding all the explicit elements of the
conspiracy charge, the commission members would also have to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the 9/11 attacks occurred. Doing so
would satisfy the requirement under international law to prove that the
underlying crime occurred.
For a conspiracy conviction under this interpretation of the
MCA, the commission must find (1) that a violation of the law of war
occurred, (2) that the defendant made an agreement with another
person or persons, (3) the object of which is to commit that violation of
the law of war, and (4) that the defendant performed some overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. These are the same requirements to
establish a violation of the international law of war via a conspiracy
mode of liability, just in a different order.200 Thus, this textually
supported interpretation of the MCA's conspiracy statute as
criminalizing only completed conspiracies, combined with the MCA's
jurisdictional restrictions, meets the Ex Post Facto Clause's restrictions
on retroactive criminalization of conduct (the conduct prong) and
removal of elements from the government's burden of proof (the legal
prong).
C. If Conspiracy Stands Alone, It Must Remain Alone
One final point remains. Adopting this interpretation of the
MCA's conspiracy statute necessarily precludes convicting a person for
both conspiracy and the underlying offense. While convictions for both
are normal and perhaps even common under the usual American
200. See supra Section III.B.1.
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conception of conspiracy,20 1 the entire thrust of this Note's argument is
that the MCA does not reflect the usual American conception of
conspiracy.
Under international law, conspiracy is only a mode of liability
for a crime, not a crime itself.20 2 A person convicted via the conspiracy
mode of liability is charged with, and found guilty of, only one offense.203
This Note has identified an interpretation of the MCA that comports
with and reflects the existing international law through a domestic
lens. It would be counterproductive to permit simultaneous conviction
for both the conspiracy and the crime itself. Doing so would untether
the conspiracy from the underlying crime, which would be incompatible
with this Note's interpretation of the MCA. 2 0 4
By foreclosing inchoate conspiracies, this Note's interpretation
of the MCA also strips away the inchoate nature of a standalone charge
for completed conspiracy. The theory upon which convictions for both
conspiracy and the underlying crime are permitted is that they are two
distinct crimes with different social harms, and the conspiracy itself
gives rise to criminal liability as soon as an overt act is committed in its
furtherance.205 This Note's interpretation, by virtue of denying
jurisdiction without proof of the completed offense, cannot give rise to
criminal liability until the underlying offense is carried out.
Accordingly, it must necessarily be understood as an interpretation
under which the crime and the conspiracy merge into a single offense.206
201. E.g., United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Snow, 48
F.3d 198, 200-01 (6th Cir. 1995); May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
United States v. DeSapio, 299 F. Supp. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Guterma, 189
F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
202. See supra Section IlI.B.1.
203. E.g., Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 38-51 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1 4
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001).
204. This Note's interpretation of the MCA is also incompatible with the § 2332(b) justification
employed by the D.C. Circuit in Bahlul I. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Like other
domestic conspiracy charges, § 2332(b) does not require the presence of victims. The MCA can be
interpreted to re-codify either § 2332(b) or existing international law, but not both. Therefore, it
would be internally inconsistent to rely on both justifications. On the other hand, even adopting
this Note's interpretation of the MCA does not preclude prosecutors from using conspiracy as a
mode of liability for other MCA offenses, as the Chief Prosecutor has done. See supra note 83. The
MCA grants jurisdiction over violations of its enumerated offenses or the law of war, and
conspiracy is a well-recognized mode of liability under the international law of war.
205. E.g., lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975).
206. Though rare, there have been other examples of this phenomenon in American law.
Crimes that require two persons for their commission cannot be charged in conjunction with
conspiracy by those two persons to commit the crime. E.g., United States v. Dietrich, 126 F. 664,
667 (D. Neb. 1904). Neither can two persons engaging in adultery be tried for conspiracy to commit
adultery. E.g., Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226, 226 (Pa. 1850). It does not seem initially
problematic for the prosecutor to charge both conspiracy and the object offense under the MCA, so
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V. CONCLUSION
Congress and the courts have struggled to bring terrorists to
justice while upholding our foundational legal principles and adhering
to the Constitution. Much progress has been made, but fourteen years
after the events of September 11, the constitutionality of charging
conspiracy in military commissions remains unresolved.207
This Note resolves the issue of conspiracy's constitutionality
through a novel, but textually supported, interpretation of the MCA.
Rather than fighting the consensus that the "law of war" in UCMJ
Article 21 is limited to international law, this Note adopts that
understanding. Contrary to the assertions of many scholars and the
D.C. Circuit, limiting the law of war to international law does not end
the analysis. A nuanced examination of concepts related to conspiracy
reveals that the MCA's unique definition thereof comports with
established international law in all respects. The only difference
between the MCA and international law prior to 2006 is the wording
Congress used. Therefore, the MCA does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
Upholding the MCA's conspiracy charge against an Ex Post
Facto challenge under the most restrictive statutory interpretation of
the meaning of "law of war" obviates the need to consider the
constitutional Article III challenge. Ruling on statutory rather than
constitutional grounds is generally preferable. It is particularly crucial
when a constitutional ruling could permanently constrain both other
branches of government as they grapple with a body of law (the law of
war) that is struggling to evolve to account for a simultaneously
evolving and nontraditional class of actors (belligerents associated with
ideologically driven non-state organizations).
Accordingly, if the Supreme Court rules on Bahlul, it should
adopt an interpretation of the MCA's conspiracy statute that only
criminalizes completed conspiracies. Doing so would definitively resolve
the issue of conspiracy's viability for pre-2006 conduct, uphold Bahlul's
conviction without violating the Constitution, and avoid wading into a
question of constitutional interpretation that stands to increase the
long as an instruction is given that only a conviction for one or the other may be returned. This,
however, is a topic that must be left for further discussion.
207. Bahlul I, 767 F.3d 1, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Brown, J., dissenting):
[B]y reviewing Bahlul's retroactivity arguments under the plain error standard, the
court disposes of this case without providing the government clear guidance for
prosecuting the remaining detainees at Guantanamo. Thus, it may be many years
before the government receives a definitive answer on whether it can charge the
September 11 perpetrators with conspiracy, or whether Congress has the power to make
such an offense triable by military commission even prospectively.
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uncertainty surrounding military commissions or unnecessarily restrict
Congress in a way that may have unforeseen impacts on foreign policy
and national security.
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